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Abstract
This Article’s thesis is that, although arbitrators in investment treaty arbitration are not for-
mally bound by precedent in the same manner as common-law judges, there is an informal, but
powerful, system of precedent that constrains arbitrators to account for prior published awards and
to stabilize international investment law. This informal system, however, imperfectly supports the
relevant policy goals. It is additionally being tested by an increasing diversity of arbitrators, who
are themselves facing pressures from investors and host States to meet conflicting demands. This
Article proposes that the structure of investment treaty arbitration can absorb such stresses if: (a)
the system of precedent is clarified and publicized to enable the global community to appraise
awards and the arbitrators who render them; (b) investors and States exercise care in their selec-
tion of arbitrators; and (c) the community of international arbitrators exercises sufficient informal
self-regulation and self-selection. This thesis is developed in three Parts. Part I discusses the con-
cept and policies of precedent as it has developed in courts. Part II examines the extent to which
these policies apply to investment treaty arbitration, and whether investment treaty arbitration has
a system of precedent that promotes the relevant policy goals. Part III makes recommendations
to further refine the system of precedent in response to emerging global trends, such as the eco-
nomic growth of the People’s Republic of China and an increasing diversity of arbitrators from
both developed and developing States.
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INTRODUCTION
Exponential increases in global trade and bilateral and mul-
tilateral investment treaties over the last half-century have led to
a proliferation of arbitrations between investors and host States
pursuant to those treaties.' Unlike international commercial ar-
bitrations between two private corporations, which are generally
confidential,2 investment treaty arbitrations are subject to lower
* Tai-Heng Cheng, Associate Professor and Associate Director, Center for Interna-
tional Law, New York Law School, J.S.D. (Yale), M.A. (Oxford). This Article expands
on remarks delivered at the International Law Weekend and the USCIB Young Arbitra-
tors Forum, where comments from fellow panelists and participants were gratefully re-
ceived. Stephen Ellmann, Brigitte Stern, and W. Michael Reisman also provided com-
ments. Matthew Abrams, Mark Stenseth, Bryan Johnson, and Tareq Mahmud provided
research assistance.
1. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD"), Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaties in the Mid-1990s, at 18-19, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7, U.N. Sales No.
E.98.II.D.8 (1998) [hereinafter UNCTAD Report] (describing exponential increase in
bilateral investment treaties); see alsoJan Paulsson, International Arbitration and the Gener-
ation of Legal Norms, TRANSNAT'L DIsp. MGMT., Dec. 2006, at 5 n.3 (noting "prodigious
expansion of international commercial arbitration in the past half-century"); Catherine
Rogers, Emerging Dilemmas in International Economic Arbitration: The Vocation of the Interna-
tional Arbitrator, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 957, 965 (2005) ("With the explosion in inter-
national trade and, consequently, trade-related disputes, the field of international arbi-
trators experienced significant expansion and diversification in the past two decades.");
Luke Eric Peterson, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Development Policy-Making 1-2, availa-
ble at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/trade-bits.pdf (describing exponential increase in
bilateral investment treaties ("BITs")); Presentation by Daniel M. Price & Andrew W.
Shoyer, Sidley Austin LLP, Understanding International Investment and Trade Rules: How
Global Companies Use Rules to Open Markets 8, 20 (July 2006), available at http://www.
rieti.go.jp/en/events/bbl/06070601.pdf (stating that there were 2,392 BITs in 2004,
and describing dramatic increase in investment treaty arbitrations).
2. See Yves Fortier, The Occasionally Unwarranted Assumption of Confidentiality, 15 ARB.
INT'L 131, 131 (1999) ("The principle that arbitrations are private and confidential as
between the parties would seem to be self-evident."); Dora Gruner, Accounting for the
Public Interest in International Arbitration, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 923, 959 (2003) ("A
central rule of most private international arbitrations today is that the proceedings and
awards are confidential, unless the parties agree otherwise."); see also Int'l Chamber of
Commerce, Rules of Arbitration, art. 21(3) (2003) ("Save with the approval of the Arbi-
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levels of confidentiality.3 In many investment treaty arbitrations,
parties have either unilaterally published the awards or con-
sented to the administering arbitral institution publishing the
awards.4 With disclosure comes public scrutiny. Because inter-
national investment law, i.e., the principles and rules of public
international law relevant to foreign investments, is a rapidly de-
veloping field, it was inevitable that arbitrators would occasion-
ally render contradictory awards. 5 These conflicts have raised ur-
gent questions about the extent to which awards are bound by a
system of precedent, and, more broadly, whether international
investment law is stable and predictable. International arbitra-
tors have acknowledged that these issues may influence both the
actual legitimacy and the public's perceptions of legitimacy of
investment treaty arbitral awards,6 and-the author suggests-
tral Tribunal and the parties, persons not involved in the proceedings shall not be ad-
mitted.").
3. See Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID (W.
Bank) Case No. ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No. 3, 125 (2006) ("There is no provi-
sion in the ICSID Arbitration Rules which expressly provides for the confidentiality of
pleadings, documents and other information... [but the parties] may agree not to do
so 'if they feel that publication may exacerbate the dispute[.]"') (citing Rule 30, Note F,
1 ICSID Rep. 93); see also Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID (W. Bank)
Case No. ARB/81/1, Award, 4, 24 I.L.M. 365, 368 (1985) ("[I]t is right to say that the
[ICSID] Convention and the Rules do not prevent the parties from revealing their
case"); North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") Free Trade Commission,
Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions § A.1 (July 31, 2001) ("Nothing in
the NAFTA imposes a general duty of confidentiality on the disputing parties to a Chap-
ter Eleven arbitration[.]"). But cf U.N. Commission on International Trade Law ("UN-
CITRAL") Arbitration Rules, art. 32(5) (Apr. 28, 1976) (providing that awards are to be
made public only with the consent of both parties).
4. See, e.g., International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID"),
ICSID Cases, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/cases.htm (publishing ICSID
awards) (last visited Jan. 8, 2007); see also U.S. Department of State Website, NAFTA
Investor-State Arbitrations, http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3439.htm (last visited Jan. 8,
2007) (publishing NAFTA awards involving the United States).
5. Compare Sociht6 G~n~rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of Philippines, ICSID
(W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, 1 126-127
(2004) (holding umbrella clause elevated contractual obligations to international law
obligations), with Soci~t6 G~nrale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan,
ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, 42 I.L.M. 1290, 1319
(2003) (holding umbrella clause did not elevate contractual obligations to interna-
tional law obligations).
6. See Paulsson, supra note 1, at 1 ("[W]hat-if any-is the dignity, or shall we say,
legitimacy, of such awards as instruments susceptible of generating international law?");
see also Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing
Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1558-87
(2005); J.C. Thomas Q.C., Presentation on Umbrella Clauses: Where Do Matters Stand 2,
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international investment law itself. Surprisingly, U.S. law reviews
appear to have published only very limited research on prece-
dent in investment treaty arbitration. 7 The purposes of this Arti-
cle are to begin to fill this lacuna, and to hopefully stimulate
productive discussions about precedent in investment treaty ar-
bitration among scholars, arbitrators, and lawyers.
This Article's thesis is that, although arbitrators in invest-
ment treaty arbitration are not formally bound by precedent in
the same manner as common-law judges, there is an informal,
but powerful, system of precedent that constrains arbitrators to
account for prior published awards and to stabilize international
investment law.' This informal system, however, imperfectly sup-
ports the relevant policy goals. It is additionally being tested by
an increasing diversity of arbitrators, who are themselves facing
pressures from investors and host States to meet conflicting de-
mands. This Article proposes that the structure of investment
treaty arbitration can absorb such stresses if: (a) the system of
precedent is clarified and publicized to enable the global com-
munity to appraise awards and the arbitrators who render them;
(b) investors and States exercise care in their selection of arbitra-
tors; (c) and the community of international arbitrators exer-
cises sufficient informal self-regulation and self-selection.
This thesis is developed in three Parts. Part I discusses the
concept and policies of precedent as it has developed in courts.
Part II examines the extent to which these policies apply to in-
vestment treaty arbitration, and whether investment treaty arbi-
tration has a system of precedent that promotes the relevant pol-
icy goals. Part III makes recommendations to further refine the
system of precedent in response to emerging global trends, such
as the economic growth of the People's Republic of China and
2006 Joint ICC-ISCID Colloquium (Washington, D.C.) (on file with author) (noting
inconsistencies in awards concerning umbrella clauses).
7. See W. Michael Reisman, The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSID Arbitra-
tion, 1989 DuKE L.J. 739, 770, 775 (1989) (noting that the annulment of the Kloeckner
award had a "constitutive dimension" and was "a precedent"); see also Alexis C. Brown,
Presumption Meets Reality, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. Rv. 969, 1013 (2001) (asserting that
"awards made in important and well-known cases are often published with commenta-
ies, and will naturally serve as precedents.").
8. See El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/03/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, 82 (2006) (explicitly stating that decision was
taken pursuant to "important precedents by Tribunals"); see also Pan American Energy
LLC v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/04/8, 110 (2006) (ex-
plicitly stating the same).
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an increasing diversity of arbitrators from both developed and
developing States.
I. THE CONCEPT AND FUNCTIONS OF PRECEDENT
In order to determine whether investment treaty arbitra-
tions have a system of precedent that sufficiently meets the rele-
vant policy goals, it is first necessary to clarify the concept and
functions of precedent within the systems of law in which it ex-
ists.
A. The Concept of Precedent
Precedent, or stare decisis, refers the doctrine under which a
court, when deciding a point of law, generally follows a holding
of a prior court on that point if that prior court is equal or supe-
rior in the judicial hierarchy.9 Even the highest appellate court
will generally follow its prior decisions on a point of law, except
in exceptional circumstances.' ° For example, the English House
of Lords in their 1966 Practice Statement instructed that the law
lords would, "while treating former decisions of this House as
normally binding, . . .depart from a previous decision when it
appears right to do so. " "'
In the United States, the Supreme Court has held that it
may depart from its own decisions if it determines that there ex-
ists an alternative legal position that is "intrinsically sounder, and
verified by experience,"'12 or where a prior decision was later de-
termined to have been wrongly decided. 3 The U.S. Supreme
Court, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
9. See generally J.W. HARRIS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 168 (1980).
10. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (Rehnquist, C. J.)
("The doctrine [of stare decisis] carries such persuasive force that we have always re-
quired a departure from precedent to be supported by some 'special justification'");
Ariz. v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) ("[A]ny departure from the doctrine of stare
dec/sis demands special justification.").
11. House of Lords, Practice Statement, (1966) 1 W.L.R. 1234 (Eng.).
12. See Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940).
13. See Payne v. Tenn., 501 U.S. 808, 809 (1991) ("[T]his Court has never felt
constrained to follow precedent when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly
reasoned .... ."); see also Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 28 (1946) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting) ("Stare decisis certainly does not require a court to perpetuate a wrong for
which it was responsible[.]"); see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305 (2004)
("[T]he claims of stare decisis are at their weakest . . .where our mistakes cannot be
corrected by Congress.").
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described the calculus that a court must undertake before de-
parting from a prior decision:
[W] hen this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment
is customarily informed by a series of prudential and prag-
matic considerations designed to test the consistency of over-
ruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law ....
[W] e may ask whether the rule has proven to be intolerable
simply in defying practical workability, whether the rule is
subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hard-
ship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to
the cost of repudiation, whether related principles of law
have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more
than a remnant of abandoned doctrine, or whether facts have
so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have
robbed the old rule of significant application or justifica-
tion."
In short, there appears to be a presumption that even unwork-
able or outdated rules of law will continue to operate until the
costs of operation outweigh the costs of instabilities that will re-
sult from changing the rule.
In jurisdictions that may not entirely share in common-law
traditions, courts may not, as a formal matter, rely solely on a
prior decision to determine a point of law.' 5 However, the judi-
cial system may still promote consistency in the law by requiring
strong reasons to depart from prior decisions. For example, the
Advocate General of the European Court of Justice has stated
that, although the Court is not formally bound by a doctrine of
precedent, "[i]t is none the less obvious that the Court should,
as a matter of practice, follow its previous case-law except where
there are strong reasons for not so doing."' 6 Whether ajurisdic-
tion follows a common-law tradition or not, there is an apparent
tendency to decide disputes consistently with prior judicial deci-
sions, except where new policy considerations strongly require a
different result or where the prior decision was wrongly decided.
B. The Functions of Precedent
Court decisions are a form of "state-sponsored dispute reso-
14. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992).
15. See Merck v. Primecrown, Ltd., Joined Cases C-267/95 & C-268/95, [1996]
E.C.R. 1-6285, 139.
16. Id. 142.
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lution" in which judges make decisions to finalize outcomes in
disputes.1 7 In democratic States, the continued existence of any
system of State-sponsored decision-making ultimately depends
on its legitimacy in the eyes of the public. The legitimacy ofjudi-
cial decision-making, and the public's perceptions of such legiti-
macy, depend on the system's performance. Substantive and
procedural tests can measure performance. Substantive tests in-
clude whether the content of legal rules balance the competing
policies at stake, and whether outcomes mediated by judicial dis-
pute resolution provide sufficient values to the interested par-
ties. i" By comparison, procedural indicia do not directly ap-
praise the content of legal rules or of legal outcomes. Instead,
they measure whether the law's processes are functioning prop-
erly to guide the evolution of rules and the derivation of out-
comes towards desirable ends.
There are numerous procedural indicia, including, for ex-
ample, due process. In the context of the present inquiry into
precedent, three procedural indicia are particularly relevant.
The first indicium is development, i.e., whether the law has mecha-
nisms that enable it to adjust to the changing needs of the com-
munity.
The second indicium, control, has two aspects. Regarding
the law generally, control refers to mechanisms that prevent wild
deviations in the law so that it is sufficiently stable for members
of the public to plan their affairs and anticipate the legal conse-
quences of their plans. Regarding judicial decision making spe-
cifically, control refers to whether judges make decisions within
the scope of their authority and whether the system corrects de-
viations caused by abuses of power and authority.
The third indicium is recognition, i.e., whether the law pro-
vides the community with tests to determine if each judicial deci-
sion has complied with the accepted methods of reasoning, as
well as whether the judicial system is operating properly as a
whole. Recognition supports control and development. It en-
ables judges, advocates, and observers to distinguish decisions
17. See Reisman, supra note 7, at 743.
18. See generally JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 81-85 (1980)
(stating that "values" refer to the basic aspects of each individual's well-being); see also
Tai-Heng Cheng, Power and Authority in International Investment Law, 20 AM. U. INT'L L.
REv. 465, 504 (2005) (describing values as "the universe of tangible and intangible ben-
efits, interests and resources.").
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that should be accepted as constituting the law from decisions
that were improperly decided and which should be marginal-
ized.
Judicial systems contain processes that are designed to im-
prove performance in the three indicia. A comprehensive dis-
cussion of the many processes is beyond the scope of this Article,
and an illustrative list is proposed in lieu: (1) The selection and
appointment or election ofjudges supports development by pro-
moting the evolution of the law through appropriate judicial de-
cision-making; (2) the mechanism for the removal of judges ex-
erts control over those judges who, through their misconduct,
pose a systemic threat to the legitimacy of the entire system; and
(3) the clarification by appellate judges of the rules for reversing
or upholding lower court decisions enhances recognition be-
cause it enables the public to determine which court decisions
are legitimate and likely to be binding.
A system of precedent is often embedded alongside these
processes to enhance performance in all three procedural indi-
cia. Development and control are, to an extent, competing indi-
cia. In order for the law to support the aspirations of the com-
munity in which it operates, it must be stable so that people in
their everyday affairs may rely on legal rules and not be penal-
ized for such reliance.1" However, the law must also be able to
adapt to the needs of the community as social conditions
change. A system of precedent harmonizes the law's perform-
ance regarding development and control. It provides a uniform
method through which judges may reach judicial decisions that
adjust the law in an evolutionary fashion to avoid triggering dra-
matic instabilities. Thus, precedent both empowers judges to
develop the law and controls the misuse of judicial power.
The control aspect of precedent can be disaggregated into
external and internal control processes.2 ° Precedent builds into
the judicial resolution of every dispute an internal norm limiting
the authority ofjudges to resolve disputes in accordance with the
19. Cf United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 399-400 (1973) (stating that "people
in their everyday affairs [should] be able to rely on [the court's] decisions and not be
needlessly penalized for such reliance."); Casey, 505 U.S. at 854-55 ("[W]e recognize
that no judicial system could do society's work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case
that raised it.").
20. See Reisman, supra note 7, at 741 (differentiating between internal and exter-
nal legal systems of control).
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law as previously clarified by prior decisions. It also contains
checks external to the decision-making processes of any particu-
lar dispute. When ajudge unjustifiably deviates from precedent,
the system triggers an external checking mechanism. A hierar-
chically superior court may, on appeal, correct that deviation
through a reversal of the lower court's decision. If the highest
appellate court departs from precedent without meeting the
conditions necessary for deviation,21 the system permits the
court to correct its deviation in a subsequent dispute if the ne-
cessity of such correction outweighs the disruption that may re-
sult from a reversal of its prior aberrant decision.
Finally, precedent improves recognition. 22 The rules of pre-
cedent provide criteria: (1) for judges to appraise whether a
prior decision should be upheld, reversed, or applied; (2) for
scholars to evaluate judicial decisions and make recommenda-
tions to improve the law; (3) for practitioners to determine
which decisions to rely on in their advocacy; and, finally, (4) for
the public to appraise the propriety of each judicial decision and
the operation of the entire judicial system itself. When ajudicial
decision has complied with the rules of precedent, that decision
may have a constitutive and developmental effect on the law, be-
cause it binds future disputes and may cause citizens to adjust
their actions in reliance on that decision. It may also have a le-
gitimating effect on the law when the various actors in the system
determine that the system is operating properly. Conversely,
where a judge has deviated from the rules of precedent, actors
may reject that judge's claim to constitute the law and anticipate
future disputes concerning whether the incorrectly decided
points of law should be rectified.
II. FUNCTIONS AND CONCEPT OF PRECEDENT IN
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION
A. Functions
The three procedural performance indicia of judicial sys-
tems are equally, if not more, applicable to the system of invest-
21. Cf Casey, 505 U.S. at 854 ("The obligation to follow precedent begins with
necessity, and a contrary necessity marks its outer limit.").
22. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 97-107 (1972) (discussing rules
of recognition and legal validity).
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ment treaty arbitration.2 3
As the needs of the international community change, inter-
national investment law must develop to address those needs.
Increases in direct foreign investments globally, the diversifica-
tion of methods and fields of investment, and the rising sophisti-
cation of investors and host states have created new demands on
international investment law. If this field of international law
could not evolve from its customary origins, it would not be able
to provide a comprehensive regulatory framework for global in-
vestments that balances the interests of all participants in this
global system.
Given the high transaction costs of treaty negotiations, it is
not practical for States to constantly renegotiate their investment
treaties; but international investment law must keep pace with
the expansion of the fields of economic cooperation into novel
industries, such as the Internet. It must also continually adjust
to the elaboration of domestic regulatory frameworks-which
often touch foreign investments-that accompany advances in
scientific knowledge, such as the effects of certain chemicals on
the environment. Because parties to investment treaties cannot
easily renegotiate them, arbitrators in investment treaty disputes
must adapt existing international treaties and customs to the
novel demands of foreign investors and host States.
Control in international investment law, and its system of
investment treaty arbitration, is also of paramount importance.
The fundamental goal of international investment law, as ex-
pressed in the preambles of countless bilateral investment trea-
ties ("BITs"), is to create favorable conditions for greater invest-
ments among States.2 4 A key condition favorable to investments
is a stable legal framework. 25 Control over the evolution of inter-
23. There could be, of course, other additional indicia, such as "integrity, open-
ness, and efficiency." See Detlev F. Vagts, The International Legal Profession: A Need for
More Governance?, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 250, 261 (1996).
24. See UNCTAD Report, supra note 1, at 30-31 (citing the BIT between Malaysia
and the United Arab Emirates and the BIT between Argentina and the Netherlands);
Saluka Invs. v. Czech Rep., UNCITRAL Partial Award, 293 (Mar. 17, 2006), available at
http://www.pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/RPC/SAL-CZ%20Partial%2Award%20170306.
pdf ("Bilateral investment treaties ... are designed to promote foreign direct invest-
ment as between the Contracting Parties.").
25. See UNCTAD Report, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that "legal protection to foreign
investments under international law ... reduce[s] as much as possible the non-com-
mercial risks facing foreign investors in host countries"); LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argen-
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national investment law as well as the outcomes of investment
treaty disputes is necessary to promote certainty in investment
outcomes and to protect the legitimacy of international invest-
ment law in the eyes of investors and host States.
Control in investment treaty arbitrations is also critical to
the proper operation of international investment law. To ad-
dress host States' and investors' skepticism about the impartiality
of domestic judicial systems, investment projects are often gov-
erned by agreements that provide for a panel of neutral arbitra-
tors to resolve disputes.2 6 Indeed, even investment treaties that
constitute the international legal framework for investment,
such as NAFTA, mandate that disputes regarding the framework
itself shall be resolved through arbitration.27 Thus, arbitration,
which is a privately sponsored system of dispute resolution, is in-
creasingly limiting the responsibilities of national courts. To the
extent that arbitral tribunals have replaced national courts, arbi-
tral tribunals must perform the control function of the courts.
In some regards, arbitral tribunals have greater control re-
sponsibilities than courts. Courts derive their authority from the
constitutional structure of the State, which often entrusts the ju-
dicial arm of government with elaborating the law for the entire
citizenry. By comparison, an arbitral tribunal derives its author-
ity from voluntary requests by disputing parties to finalize out-
comes in the dispute.2" No other participant in the global com-
munity has consented to the jurisdiction of the tribunal or dele-
gated to it authority to elaborate the law for the community.
Because constituting international investment law exceeds the
formal mandate that tribunals obtain from arbitration agree-
ments, arbitrators should render awards with a high degree of
circumspection concerning potentially constitutive portions of
their awards.
Further, unlike domestic courts, arbitral tribunals do not ex-
tine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, 124
(2006) (concluding that the "stability of the legal and business framework" was an "es-
sential element" of the object and purpose of the BIT in question).
26. See Thuy Le Tran, Vietnam: Can An Effective Arbitration System Exist?, 20 Lo'.
L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 361, 363 (1998).
27. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, ch.
11, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
28. See Rogers, supra note 1, at 990.
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ist within hierarchical dispute resolution structures. 29 Whereas
an appellate court may correct a wrongly-decided lower court
decision, arbitral awards are not generally subject to appellate
review by another arbitral tribunal or even by a national court.3 0
Granted, national courts may exercise some control by refusing
to enforce awards that violate public policy or exceed the scope
of the arbitration agreement, 31 and annulment committees may
scrutinize awards for grave procedural errors or a manifest ex-
cess of powers. 32 However, these limited control mechanisms
are far narrower in scope than judicial review.3 3 Courts and an-
29. See Paulsson, supra note 1, at 3 ("[T]ribunals ... are not part of a hierarchal
system.").
30. See ICSID Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of Other States, Oct. 14, 1966, art. 53(1), 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575
U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
31. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, art. V(2), June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 ("Recognition and
enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the
country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that... The recognition or
enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.");
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 615, 638 (1985) ("The
[Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards] reserves
to each signatory country the right to refuse enforcement of an award where the 'recog-
nition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that coun-
try.'"); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 n.14 (1974) (noting that the
alleged fraud committed by the defendant could have been raised under Article V of
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards as
grounds for refusing to recognize the arbitral award since it would have been contrary
to public policy); see also Canada International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.B.C.,
ch. 233, § 34(1) (2) (providing that an award may only be annulled if it exceeded the
jurisdiction of the tribunal or violated public policy); United Mexican States v. Metal-
clad Corp., [2001] B.C.S.C. 664, 67 (Can.) (annulling award because the "Tribunal
made decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration").
32. See ICSID Convention, supra note 30, art. 52(1) (stating limited grounds for
annulment); see also Mitchell (Patrick) v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID (W.
Bank) Case No. ARB/99/7 (2004) (annulling award); Compafii~i de Aguas del Acon-
quija S.A. and Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/97/3, 95-98 (2002) (partially annulling award); Kloeckner GmbH. v. United
Republic of Cameroon, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/81/2, (1986) (annulling
award); Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/81/
1, (1986) (annulling award).
33. See BRIDAS S.A.I.P.C. et al. v. Turkmenistan, 447 F.3d 441 (5th Cir. 2006) (de-
nying annulment); Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, [2006]
EWCA (Civ) 1116, 2006 EWHC 345 (QB) (Eng.) (denying annulment); Feldman v.
Mexico, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/99/1 (2005) (denying annulment);
Sedelmayer v. Russian Federation, No. T 525-03 (Svea Court of Appeal, June 15, 2005)
(Swed.) (denying annulment), available at http://www.investmentclaims.com/
decisions/37b%20-%2OSedelmayer-Svea-Judgment.ENGI.doc; S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Ca-
nada, [2004] F.C. 38 (Fed. Ct.) (Can.) (denying annulment); CDC Group Plc. v. Repub-
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nulment committees cannot reverse awards for errors of law.
While some aggressive courts have adopted artificial views that a
mere error of law is a "manifest error" justifying annulment, and
that a tribunal's misapplication of the law exceeded its jurisdic-
tion because it only had jurisdiction to interpret the applicable
law correctly,34 few courts have acted so aggressively. Absent
comprehensive external controls through appellate review, con-
trols internal to each investment treaty arbitration become all
the more important.
Arbitral tribunals adjudicating investment treaty disputes
also have greater control responsibilities than arbitrators in pri-
vate commercial disputes. To the extent that investment treaty
arbitrations are not confidential, their awards may have a consti-
tutive effect on international investment law if third-party observ-
ers adjust their strategies in anticipation that future similar dis-
putes will lead to similar outcomes. There is thus a need to
avoid deviating dramatically from existing laws and precipitating
costly shifts in investment plans. There is also a need to avoid
prescribing law that will lead to substantively bad outcomes in
investment disputes and other unrelated investment arrange-
ments. By comparison, to the extent that commercial arbitra-
tions are confidential, their awards will not generally have a con-
stitutive effect on commercial transnational law. If third parties
cannot discover a confidential arbitral award, they will not adjust
their strategies, and the consequences of that award will be lim-
ited to the parties to the dispute.
Recognition is critical in international investment law and
investment treaty arbitration. In order for arbitrations to sup-
port control and development in international investment law,
arbitrators need shared procedural methods to distinguish be-
tween awards that should be followed and those that were im-
properly decided and therefore deserve less deference. Inves-
lic of the Seychelles, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/14 (2003) (denying annul-
ment); CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL (2003), available at
http://www.sccinstitute.com/_upload/shared-files/artikelarkiv/tjeckiska-re pubiken.
pdf (denying annulment); Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID (W.
Bank) Case No. ARB/98/4 (2002) (denying annulment).
34. Compare ICSID Convention, supra note 30, art. 52(1), with Metalclad Corp.,
[2001] B.C.S.C. 664, 70 (Can.) (annulling award and holding that the "Tribunal
made decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration" because
it had "misstated the applicable law to include transparency obligations and then it
made its decision on the basis of the concept of transparency").
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tors and host States need tests to appraise decisions, to anticipate
whether these decisions have a constitutive effect on the law, and
to determine whether they should adjust their investment strate-
gies accordingly. Because the writings of "the most highly quali-
fied publicists" are a source of international law,35 leading jurists
and next-generation scholars who aspire towards eminence must
have some method to guide their appraisal of awards, so that
they may responsibly instruct other actors about the significance
of each award. Most importantly, because arbitration is a pri-
vately-sponsored system, its continued growth and existence de-
pends on the global community believing that it is legitimate.36
This global community of investors, States, observers, scholars,
and lawyers can only appraise the legitimacy of arbitration if the
system furnishes tests of recognition.
B. Formalist Approaches to Precedent
Under a strict formalist approach to international law, arbi-
tral awards appear to have little precedential value. According
to positivists, international law is a system of legal rules with
which international actors are required to comply." Tribunals
and courts, as actors within this system, are required to deter-
mine the applicable rules of international law by reference to
rules that identify the sources of law.
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice (the "ICJ Statute") provides that the sources of interna-
tional law are:
(a) international covenants, whether general or particular, es-
tablishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting par-
ties;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law;
35. Statute of International Court ofJustice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1)(d), 59 Stat.
1031, 1060 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
36. See THOMAS FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 26
(1998) (noting that in a legal system, "legitimacy validates community" and "pro-
mote[s] voluntary compliance by those to whom [its norms are] addressed").
37. See Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Appraising the Methods of Interna-
tional Law: A Prospectus for Readers, 93 Am. J. INT'L L. 291, 293 (1999) ("Positivism sum-
marizes a range of theories that focus upon describing the law as it is, backed up by
effective sanctions, with reference to formal criteria, independently of moral or ethical
considerations.").
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(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized na-
tions;
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions
and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of
the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determina-
tion of the rules of law.38
Under the ordinary meaning of these terms, 9 the principle
sources of international law are treaties, customary law as deter-
mined by widespread State practice and opinio juris (a belief in
the existence of the rule), and general principles.4 ° Judicial de-
cisions and the writings of the most highly qualified publicists
are merely "subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law."4 1 Indeed,judicial decisions are explicitly subject to the lim-
itation contained in Article 59 of the ICJ Statute that decisions of
the International Court of Justice (the "ICJ") have "no binding
force except between the parties and in respect of that particular
case."4 2 It would appear, then, that under Article 38, the resolu-
tions of international disputes do not take precedent over cus-
tomary law or treaties and do not render resjudicata the interpre-
tation of customary law and treaties.4
Even accepting, for the moment, that international law
should be conceived of in positivist terms, there are three for-
malist responses to the strict interpretation of Article 38, which
appears to preclude a system of precedent in investment treaty
arbitrations. Each of these responses is imperfect, but at least,
collectively, raise a specter of doubt as to the proper interpreta-
tion of Article 38.
First, the ICJ Statute, by its own terms, binds only the ICJ.44
It provides neither that its articles codify the customary law gen-
erally applicable to all actors in the international system, nor
38. ICJ Statute, supra note 35, art. 38(1).
39. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31 (1), opened for signature
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] ("A
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and pur-
pose.").
40. See ICJ Statute, supra note 35, art. 38(1).
41. Id. art. 38(1)(d).
42. Id. art. 59.
43. See Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law (Part One
of a Trilogy), 14 Am. U. INT'L L. REv. 845, 865 (1999).
44. ICJ Statute, supra note 35, art. 1.
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that it governs arbitral tribunals. This argument is, however, not
completely persuasive because positivists regard Article 38 of the
ICJ Statute as codifying the customary rules on sources of law. 45
Further, most investment treaty arbitrations are conducted
under the auspices of the International Center for the Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") and the Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between State and Na-
tionals of Other States of 1965 (the "Washington Convention").
Although Article 42(1) of the Washington Convention provides
that arbitrators may apply international law without referring to
the ICJ Statute, the Executive Directors of the World Bank have
instructed that "international law" under Article 42(1) is to be
"understood in the sense given to it by Article 38(1) of the [ICJ
Statute] ."46
Second, Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute may not be a com-
prehensive codification of the customary law on sources of law.
For example, Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties of 1969 ("Vienna Convention") recognizes peremptory
norms in international law (jus cogens) that are hierarchically su-
perior to even treaties and customary law.47 In Barcelona Trac-
tion, the majority judgment, supported by twelve judges, found
that jus cogens existed as an independent source of law.48
This response, however, misses the point. Even though Arti-
cle 38 may not exhaust the sources of international law, it does
explicitly account for judicial decisions and provides that they
are merely a subsidiary source of law. Technically speaking, arbi-
tral awards are not judicial decisions, and one could argue that
awards may not fall within the ambit of Article 38(1) (d). But,
pursuant to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties of 1969 ("Vienna Convention"), Article 38(1) (d) of the
ICJ Statute should be interpreted in the context of the object
45. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 5 (6th ed. 2003);
MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 66-67 (5th ed. 2004).
46. INT'L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECToRs
ON THE CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND
NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES 40 (2006), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/
basicdoc/CRREnglish-final.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2007).
47. Vienna Convention, supra note 39, art. 53.
48. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), [1970] I.C.J. 3, 32
(Feb. 5) (noting thatjus cogens "derive, for example, in contemporary international law,
from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles
and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person").
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and purpose of the ICJ Statute,49 as revealed, inter alia, by the
text of the Statute itself.50 The ICJ Statute is almost completely
deferential to State sovereignty. A State is not bound by any de-
cision of the ICJ unless it has consented to the ICJ's jurisdic-
tion. 51 Even with such consent, it is only bound as regards the
dispute before the ICJ and no other dispute.52 Arbitral awards
are "the functional equivalent of 'judicial decisions.'- 53 They are
rendered only with the consent of the parties to the arbitration.
In light of the preeminent position given to sovereignty and the
explicit limitations on legal effects on non-parties to consensual
dispute resolution, it is unlikely that, under Article 38, awards
are meant to be more authoritative than judicial decisions.
Third, the customary law that Article 38 codified in 1945
may have evolved to now give decisions and awards greater
standing in the hierarchy of sources. In spite of the plain mean-
ing of Article 38(1)(d), positivists Bruno Simma and Andreas
Paulus have conceded that the "importance of [decisions of in-
ternational tribunals] for the clarification of legal rules nowa-
days can hardly be overestimated." 54 This evolutionary view of
decisions and awards is certainly consistent with the writings of
other jurists who have concluded that other aspects of Article 38
have evolved since 1945 5 and that its interpretation should ac-
count for "the legal environment at the time an interpretation is
called for."56 This response is, however, mired in circularity.
The writings of the most learned jurists on the evolutionary na-
ture of Article 38 can conclusively elevate decisions and awards
to primary sources of law only if writings are hierarchically equal
or superior to treaties and custom. However, for these writings
to be hierarchically equal or superior to treaties and customary
49. Vienna Convention, supra note 39, art. 31(1).
50. Id. art. 31(2).
51. ICJ Statute, supra note 35, art. 36.
52. See id. art. 59; see Philip V. Tisne, The ICJ and Municpal Law: The Precedential
Effect of the Avena and Lagrand Decisions in U.S. Courts, 29 FoRDrHA INT'L LJ. 865 (2006)
(arguing that ICJ treaty interpretations do not bind U.S. federal courts in domestic
litigation).
53. Paulsson, supra note 1, at 3.
54. Bruno Simma & Andreas Paulus, The Responsibility of Individuals for Human
Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View, 93 AM.J. INT'L L. 302, 307 (1999).
55. SeeJonathan Charney, International Lawmaking-Article 38 of the ICJ Reconsidered,
in NEW TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 176 (Jost Delbruck ed., 1997); see also
Paulsson, supra note 1, at 6 ("Article 38 itself has never been immutable").
56. Paulsson, supra note 1, at 8.
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law (and, specifically, the rules contained in Article 38), Article
38 must be evolutionary. This evolutionary approach is neither
explicitly within the ordinary meaning of the terms of Article 38,
nor contained in the rules of treaty interpretation in Article 31
of the Vienna Convention. 7
C. Precedent in Practice
The reality is that decision makers in international law, in-
cluding scholars,58 arbitrators, judges, and lawyers, rely upon ar-
bitral awards. 9 The elaborate and highly technical arguments
necessary to reinterpret Article 38 of the ICJ Statute to resemble
reality draw attention to the gulf between rhetoric and reality.
The insurmountable task of closing this gap in accordance with
codified rules of treaty interpretation indicates that a radical de-
parture from formalism is necessary to fully appreciate how pre-
cedent actually operates in investment treaty arbitration.
An alternative-and, in this author's view, more useful-ap-
proach to understanding precedent in investment treaty arbitra-
tion is to study clusters of awards that address similar points of
law. Scholars may determine through these awards how arbitra-
tors actually decide disputes and extrapolate trends in the meth-
ods of arbitral decision-making. They can also identify condi-
tions that promote these trends. Then, to the extent that global
conditions may be changing, scholars can anticipate pressures
on existing trends and propose recommendations to keep trends
on their desired course.6 °
Because arbitral tribunals are not organized in a hierarchy,
there are no decisions from superior tribunals to follow. But
there is a system of precedent in arbitration that accounts for
prior decisions in a manner similar to the way in which trial or
57. Vienna Convention, supra note 39, art. 31.
58. See BROWNLIE, supra note 45, at 19 ("The literature of the law contains frequent
reference to the decisions of arbitral tribunals.").
59. See Paulsson, supra note 1, at 12 ("That a special jurisprudence is developing
from the leading awards in the domain of investment arbitration can only be denied by
those determined to close their eyes."); see also infra Parts II.C.(1), (2), (3) (discussing
how arbitrators account for prior awards in their decision making).
60. For detailed expositions policy-oriented of this approach to international legal
problems, see generally W. Michael Reisman, The View From the New Haven School of
International Law, 86 Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 118 (1992); Harold Lasswell & Myers
McDougal, Jurisprudence in Policy-Oriented Perspective, 19 U. FLA. L. REv. 486; Siegfried
Wiessner & Andrew Willard, Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence & Human Rights Abuses in Inter-
nal Conflict, 93 A. J. INT'L L. 316, 317-21 (1999).
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appellate courts account for prior decisions of hierarchically
equal courts. Like the U.S. Supreme Court's decision-making,
61
investment treaty arbitration tribunals tend to: (1) identify prior
relevant decisions; (2) compare the aggregate costs of departure
from prior decisions with the aggregate consequences of follow-
ing prior decisions, taking into account whether the policies un-
derlying those prior decisions remain relevant under contempo-
rary conditions; (3) decide which prior decisions to follow or de-
part from; and (4) articulate reasons for their decision.6 2
To test this hypothesis, this Article looks to the treatment of
two controversial concepts by investment treaty arbitration tribu-
nals: the fair and equitable treatment standard, and umbrella
clauses. The fair and equitable treatment standard, broadly
speaking, obliges host States to treat foreign investments in an
even-handed manner.6 An umbrella clause in an investment
treaty may purport to elevate all contractual obligations between
the host State and foreign investor to the level of a treaty obliga-
tion.6 4 The treatment of these two concepts by investment treaty
arbitration tribunals is illustrative because there is a sufficient
body of published decisions to examine whether tribunals have
applied consistent methods of reasoning to explain these con-
cepts. The manner in which tribunals address prior inconsistent
awards reveals how the system of precedent operates in arbitra-
tion because some awards have differed in their conceptions of
both the fair and equitable treatment standard as well as um-
brella clauses.
1. The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard
The fair and equitable standard undoubtedly forms part of
customary investment law.65 It was first codified in the Havana
61. See supra, Part I.A.
62. Cf ICSID Convention, supra note 30, art. 52(1) (e) (providing that an award
may be annulled for failure "to state the reasons on which it is based").
63. See generally Catherine Yannaca-Small, Directorate for Fin. and Enter. Affairs,
Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law 25-39 (Org. for Econ.
Co-Operation and Dev. ("OECD"), Working Paper No. 2004/3, 2004), http://www.
oecd.org/dataoecd/22/53/33776498.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2007).
64. See Katia Yannaca-Small, Directorate for Fin. and Enter. Affairs, Interpretation of
the Umbrella Clause in Investment Agreements 22 (OECD, Working Paper No. 2006/3,
2006), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/20/37579220.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2007).
65. See OECD, Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, art. I cmt.
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Charter of 1948.66 Today, thousands of BITs and several impor-
tant multilateral trade-related agreements have codified the fair
and equitable treatment standard.67
But these agreements have not necessarily explained the
fair and equitable treatment standard clearly. 68 Consequently, al-
though many commentators accept that the fair and equitable
treatment standard imposes at least a "minimum standard,"6 9
they have also observed that "its meaning has not been precisely
defined."70
At first blush, there might not appear to be a system of pre-
cedent because arbitral tribunals have fundamentally disagreed
on a definition of the fair and equitable treatment standard.
While, for example, the tribunal in Genin v. Estonia held that the
standard only prohibited a "willful neglect of duty, an insuffi-
ciency of action falling far below international standards, or even
subjective bad faith,"71 the panel in Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United
States held that this low customary minimum standard has risen
over time as a result of the State practice of concluding invest-
(1962), reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 241 (1963) (explaining that the fair and equitable treat-
ment standard "forms part of customary law").
66. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT, HAVANA CHARTER FOR AN INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION, art. 11(2), U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/78, U.N. Sales No.
48.II.D.4 (1948).
67. See, e.g., Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency, art. 12(d)(iv), Oct. 11, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1605; NAFTA, art. 1105; see also
UNCTAD REPORT, supra note 1, at 54 (citing BITs that impose a fair and equitable
treatment standard).
68. SeeAzurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/12
(Award), 358 (2006) (stating the content of the fair and equitable treatment standard
needed clarification); see also Yannaca-Small, supra note 63, at 1 ("Discussion of this
standard has focused mainly on whether the standard of treatment required is mea-
sured against the customary international minimum standard, a broader international
law standard including... treaties. . . , or whether the standard is an autonomous self-
contained concept in treaties").
69. OECD, supra note 65, art. 1, cmt.
70. UNCTAD Report, supra note 1, at 53.
71. Genin v. Estonia, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/99/2 (Award), 367
(2001); see also UPS v. Canada (Award on Jurisdiction), 1 97 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL,
Nov. 22, 2002), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/Jurisdic-
tion%20Award.22Nov02.pdf; Azinian v. Mexico, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/
97/2, 92 (1999) (referring to fair and equitable treatment standard as minimum stan-
dard in international law); Neer v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 RII.A.A. 60,
61 (U.S.-Mex. Gen. Claims Comm'n 1926) (stating that conduct must be outrageous,
egregious and in bad faith to violate the standard).
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ment treaties with stronger investment protections.72 Further
confounding the issue, the panel in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada
held that the fair and equitable treatment standard imposed a
higher standard of fairness than the minimum standard, 73 and
the Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic tribunal went so far as to
hold that the fair and equitable treatment standard now protects
legitimate investor expectations even in the absence of bad faith
or egregious conduct by the host State.74
There also appears to be uncertainty about the extent to
which the standard permits governments to take regulatory ac-
tions in accordance with domestic law. Some tribunals have
found that governments did not violate the standard when they
took actions in accordance with domestic law, even though those
actions reduced the value of foreign investments. 71 Other tribu-
nals, however, have held that government actions would not vio-
late the standard only if the actions were taken for a bona fide
public purpose and did not fall short of the investors' legitimate
expectations.76 Indeed, the decisions in Lauder v. Czech Republic
72. See, e.g., Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. U.S., ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2,
125 (2002).
73. See Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, 1 110-117 (UNCITRAL/NAFTA, Apr. 10,
2001), available at http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/Pope/PopelnterimMerits
Award.pdf.
74. SeeAzurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/12
(Award), 372 (2006); see also CMS Gas Transmission Co., Inc. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/8, 280 (2005) (stating that the standard was
"unrelated to whether the Respondent has had any deliberate intention or bad faith in
adopting the measures in question"); Techmed v. Mexico, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/00/2 (Award) (2003) (holding that the standard protected legitimate investor
expectation); Middle E. Cement v. Egypt, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/99/6
(Award), IT 97, 174 (Apr. 12, 2002) (failing to notify investor of seizure of property was
a due process breach that fell below standard); Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID (W. Bank)
Case No. ARB/97/7 (2001) (holding that fair and equitable treatment included trans-
parency); S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada (Partial Award), 11 259, 268 (NAFTA/UNCI-
TRAL, Nov. 13, 2000), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/
myersvcanadapartialaward final_13-11-00.pdf (indicating that standard included non-
discrimination, and breach of national treatment rule also breached fair and equitable
treatment standard); Am. Mfg. & Trading, Inc. v. Zaire, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/93/1 (1997) (failing to take every measure to protect and secure foreign invest-
ment violated standard).
75. See, e.g., Noble Ventures v. Romania, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/11
(2005) (holding that bankruptcy proceedings did not violate standard because they
were conducted according to national law); see also GAMI Invs., Inc. v. United Mexican
States (Final Award), 38(B) (UNCITRAL, Nov. 15, 2004) (dismissing claim because
the government could enforce its domestic law).
76. MTD v. Chile, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/7, 187-188 (2004) (hold-
1034 FORDHAMIN-TERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 30:1014
and CME v. Czech Republic, both of which addressed a similar dis-
pute arising under similarly worded fair and equitable treatment
provisions in two separate BITs, took opposite positions-the
Lauder tribunal found that the standard had not been breached
while the CME tribunal found that a breach of the standard had
occurred.77
Another substantive issue on which tribunals have disagreed
is whether the fair and equitable treatment standard prohibits
the host State from discriminating against the investor in com-
parison to other domestic and foreign investors. The majority of
the tribunal in S.D. Myers v. Canada held that the fair and equita-
ble treatment standard in Article 1105 of the North American
Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") included a principle of non-
discrimination, which arose out of Article 1102 of NAFTA and
independently of customary international law.78 In Methanex v.
United States, however, the tribunal held that the fair and equita-
ble treatment treaty standard did not incorporate protections
beyond customary law and that "non-discrimination" was not
part of the standard.7"
These apparent differences in how tribunals have explained
the fair and equitable treatment standard do not conclusively in-
dicate that there is no system of precedent. Notably, the fair and
equitable treatment standard has existed for almost a century,
with the first decision rendered in 1927 in the Neer case, 0 and
ing that Chile breached the standard by approving an investment that was against its
urban policy); see also Vagts, supra note 23, at 34-35 (arguing that the standard prohibits
"regulatory action without bona fide government purpose ...designed to make the
investor's business unprofitable.").
77. Compare Lauder v. Czech Republic, 1 314 (UNCITRAL, Sept. 3, 2001) (holding
that the standard is a minimum international standard and government actions to en-
force domestic law in that dispute did not violate the standard), with CME v. Czech Re-
public, 647 (UNCITRAL, Mar. 14, 2003) (holding that measures making investment
unprofitable, except for bona fide government purposes, violated fair and equitable
treatment standard).
78. S.D. Myers v. Canada, 266-268 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Nov. 13, 2000) (stating
that in this dispute, violation of Article 1102 constituted violation of Article 1105); see
also Waste Mgmt. v. Mexico, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3 (2004) (hold-
ing that the standard protects legitimate expectations, prohibits discrimination and re-
quires transparency).
79. See Methanex v. United States, 16, 25-26 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Aug. 3, 2005).
The Methanex decision was rendered after the NAFTA Notes of Interpretation were
issued, and followed the Notes.
80. See generally Neer v. United Mexican States, 4 R.I.A.A. 60 (U.S.-Mex. Gen.
Claims Comm'n 1926).
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the most recent decision as of this writing rendered on October
3, 2006 in LG&E Corp. v. Argentina."' Just as the jurisprudence
of the U.S. Supreme Court in controversial areas, such as racial
segregation,82 the right to abortion, 3 and laws against sodomy, 4
has evolved dramatically over the last fifty years, international de-
cisions interpreting the fair and equitable treatment standard
have changed over the last seventy years.8"
Moreover, a close examination of the awards rendered in
2006 that address the fair and equitable treatment standard-
Saluka Invs. v. Czech Republic;86 Azurix;87 LG&E Corp. 8-indicates
that tribunals do in fact operate within the system of precedent
proffered by this Article. The three tribunals all concluded that:
(1) what was required under the fair and equitable treatment
standard was highly fact-specific; 89 (2) the host State needed to
provide measures that would ensure business and legal stability
81. See, e.g., LG&E Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/
02/1 (2006).
82. Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding that all racial classi-
fications imposed by government must be analyzed by a reviewing court under "strict
scrutiny"), with Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that a statute requiring
railroads carrying passengers to provide equal but separate accommodations for white
or colored races was not unconstitutional).
83. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), with Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
84. Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that a Texas statute
making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual
conduct was unconstitutional), with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding
that Georgia's sodomy statute did not violate the fundamental rights of homosexuals).
85. See Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/
99/2, 123 (2002) (explaining that the standard of investment protection has in-
creased since the 1920s); see also LG&E, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/1, 123
(2006) (explaining that interpretations of the standard "varies with the course of
time").
86. See, e.g., Saluka Invs. v. Czech Republic, 1 293 (UNCITRAL Mar. 17, 2006),
available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/RPC/SAL-CZ%2Partial%2OAward%
20170306.pdf.
87. See Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Rep., ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/12
(Award), 372 (2006).
88. See, e.g., LG&E, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/1 (2006).
89. See, e.g., id. 123 (stating that interpretation of the standard varies "with the
circumstances of each case"); Saluka Invs., 1 291 (UNCITRAL Mar. 17, 2006) ("to the
extent that the case law reveals different formulations of the relevant thresholds, an in-
depth analysis may well demonstrate that they could be explained by the contextual and
factual differences of the cases to which the standards have been applied"); Azurix,
ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/12, 1 377 (2006) (stating that the facts of the
dispute had to be "considered together" to determine if the standard had been
breached); see also Mondev, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, 1 118 (2002)
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to attract foreign investments;9" and (3) bad faith was not a nec-
essary element for breach of the standard.9'
Each of the three tribunals followed the system of precedent
articulated in this Article to reach their substantive conclusions.
All three tribunals first canvassed the prior awards that counsel
had brought to their attention.92 The tribunals all concluded
that the majority of the awards tended not to protect legitimate
investor expectations, including expectations of good faith, due
process, and non-discrimination from the host State.9" Next, the
tribunals studied the policy reasons underpinning the articula-
tion of the standard by prior tribunals. They concluded that the
policies of promoting investments through a stable legal and
business environment that were relevant to the disputes before
the prior tribunals remained relevant, especially because these
policies were embedded in preambles of the BITs.94 Based on
this calculus, the tribunals decided to follow the view of the ma-
jority of prior decisions.9"
In concluding that bad faith was not a requirement, none of
the tribunals ignored Genin. All three tribunals acknowledged
that prior awards had interpreted Genin as importing bad faith
into the standard.9 6 Like domestic courts that seek to harmonize
apparently inconsistent prior decisions by interpreting those de-
cisions narrowly, the LG&E and Saluka Invs. tribunals inter-
(stating that "[a] judgment of what is fair and equitable cannot be reached in abstract;
it must depend on the facts of the particular case").
90. LG&E, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/1, 124 (2006); Azurix, ICSID (W.
Bank) Case No. ARB/01/12, 372 (2006) (UNCITRAL Mar. 17, 2006); Saluka Invs.,
393 (UNCITRAL Mar. 17, 2006).
91. LG&E, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/1, 129; Azurix, ICSID (W. Bank)
Case No. ARB/01/12, 372; Saluka Invs., 1 295 (UNCITRAL Mar. 17, 2006).
92. See Saluka Invs., 11 286-91 (UNCITRAL Mar. 17, 2006) (noting that Claimant
relied on Mondev, Pope & Talbot, Inc., and Waste Mgmt., while Respondent relied on
Genin and Neer, and discussing these awards); see also Azurix, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/01/12, 1 365-371 (2006) (discussing awards relied on by parties, namely Neer,
Genin, Mondev, Loewen, Waste Mgmt., and CMS Gas); LG&E, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/02/1, 71 125-29 2006 (noting and discussing recent awards addressing the stan-
dard).
93. See Saluka Invs., 77 300-305; Azurix, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/12, I
372 (2006); LG&E, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/1, 1 130.
94. See Saluka Invs., 1 298-301; LG&E, 71 124-125; Azurix, ICSID (W. Bank) Case
No. ARB/01/12, 371-372.
95. See Azurix, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/12, 372; Saluka Invs., 309;
LG&E, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/1, 1 131.
96. See Azurix, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/12, 77 366-367 (2006); Saluka
Invs., 11 289, 295; LG&E, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/1, 129 (2006).
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preted Genin as holding that bad faith was merely one way in
which the standard could be breached, but that bad faith was not
a necessary requirement for breach.97 The Azurix tribunal took
a different approach that is nonetheless familiar to domestic
judges: It concluded that to the extent that Genin imposed a bad
faith requirement for breach, this was a minority view, and the
tribunal elected to follow the majority view that bad faith was not
required.98
In sum, the awards in 2006 concerning the fair and equita-
ble treatment standard support a hypothesis that there is a sys-
tem of precedent that operates in investment treaty arbitrations.
Like domestic courts, tribunals survey the field of prior deci-
sions, select those decisions that are most relevant to the dispute
before them, and consider those decisions. While there is no
formal procedure for overruling a prior inconsistent decision,
arbitral tribunals account for obsolete decisions in a manner
similar to the modus operandi of hierarchally equal courts. Tribu-
nals might distinguish the prior case or interpret it narrowly, or
elect to follow a majority of cases taking an opposite view.
Subsequently, other tribunals can decide which view to fol-
low. Over time, arbitral consensus may develop around a pre-
ferred legal standard. If and when this consensus coalesces, the
alternative standard that does not fully support the relevant
global policies will effectively fall into disuse.
This system of precedent exerts control over poorly decided
or archaic decisions, albeit in an evolutionary fashion rather
than through the dramatic and immediate breaks from prior de-
cisions that may occur in a domestic system when its Supreme
Court overrules a prior decision. Depending on the pace of
evolution, scholars and practitioners may initially observe incon-
sistencies among decisions. But a steady and deliberate process
of precedent operates behind the illusion of arbitrary decision-
making.
2. Umbrella Clauses
The interpretation of umbrella clauses by arbitral tribunals
is another research area that reveals how precedent operates in
97. See Saluka Invs., 11 289, 295; LG&E, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/1,
129.
98. See Azurix, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/12, 372.
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investment treaty arbitration. In 1967, the OECD proposed in
Article 2 of its draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign
Property that a host State should "ensure the observance of un-
dertakings given by it in relation to property of nationals of any
other Party [to the Convention]." 9' Since that time, many BITs
have included similarly-worded "umbrella clauses" that on the
face of their wording, appear to oblige host States to observe, as
a matter of treaty obligation, all investment obligations under-
taken towards investors from the State of the BIT party."' ° For
example, Article X(2) of the Switzerland-Philippines BIT states:
"Each Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it has as-
sumed with regard to specific investments in its territory by inves-
tors of the other Contracting Party."' 1 Article 11 of the Switzer-
land-Pakistan BIT provides: "Either Contracting Party shall con-
stantly guarantee the observance of the commitments it has
entered into with respect to the investments of the investors of
the other Contracting Party.
1 0 2
It is well established that purely contractual breaches are
distinct from treaty breaches of BITs. °3 Contractual breaches
are governed by the law as determined by the choice of law pro-
visions of the investment contracts, whereas breaches of BITs are
governed by treaty and customary law obligations contained in
the BITs. However, some investors have claimed that broadly-
99. OECD, supra note 65, art. II (referring to what has come to be known as an
"umbrella clause"); see also Anthony Sinclair, The Origins of the Umbrella Clause in the
International Law of Investment Protection, 20 ARB. INT'L 411, 414-18 (2004).
100. See Prosper Weil, Problanes Relatifs aux Contacts Passs Entre un Etat et un Particu-
lier, 28 RECEUIL DES COURS (III) 95, 130 (1969) ("The intervention of the umbrella
treaty transforms contractual obligations into international obligations .... ").
101. Cited in Socift6 G~n~rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of Philippines, IC-
SID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6 (Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction), 115
(2004).
102. Cited in Soci~t6 G~n~rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan,
ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/13 (Decision on Jurisdiction), 1 163, 42 I.L.M.
1290, 1318 (2003).
103. See Compafiii de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/97/3, 77 95-98, 101 (2002); CMS Gas Trans-
mission Co., Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/8, 1 299
(2005) ("commercial disputes arising from breach of contract have been distinguished
from disputes arising from the breach of treaty standards and their respective causes of
action."); STEPHEN SCHWEBEL, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THREE SALIENT PROBLEMS
111 (1987) ("so long as it afford remedies in its Courts, a State is only directly responsi-
ble, on the international plane, for acts involving breaches of contract, where the
breach is not a simple breach").
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worded umbrella clauses transform contractual breaches into
treaty breaches and obliterate any significant distinction between
private contract law and international treaty law.1"4
As of this writing, ten tribunals have considered whether
umbrella clauses transform contractual obligations into treaty
obligations, such that breaches of investment contracts are also
breaches of the BIT.' This issue is of great practical impor-
tance because it often determines whether an arbitral tribunal
convened under the dispute resolution provision of a BIT has, as
a result of an umbrella clause in the BIT, jurisdiction over a con-
tractual dispute to determine if the obligation had been
breached and, if so, what remedy is appropriate." 6
The decisions of the ten tribunals that have considered um-
brella clauses are inconsistent, suggesting that even if a system of
precedent exists, the system is not functioning properly. On the
one hand, SGS v. Pakistan and four subsequent awards took the
view that the umbrella clause in their respective BITs did not
transform the purported contractual breaches of the host State
into treaty breaches.1"7 On the other hand, SGS v. Philippines
and four other awards took the opposite view that the umbrella
clause relevant to their respective disputes could or did trans-
form at least some contractual obligations into treaty obligations
(though they differed on the precise scope of this transforma-
104. See, e.g., El Paso Energy International Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W.
Bank) Case No. ARB/03/15, 67 (Decision on Jurisdiction 2006) (noting that Claim-
ants had argued that an umbrella clause "transform [s] all contractual undertakings into
international law obligations, and accordingly, to turn breaches of the slightest such
obligations by the Respondent into breaches of the BIT.").
105. See generally SGS v. Pakistan, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/13, 42 I.L.M.
1290; SGS v. Philippines, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6; Eureko v. Republic of
Poland, Ad Hoc Arb., Aug. 19, 2005; CMS Gas, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/8;
Noble Ventures v. Romania, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/11 (2005); El Paso
Energy Int'l Co., ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/15; Pan American Energy LLC v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/04/8, (2006);Joy Mining Machin-
ery Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/11 (2004);
Salini Construttori S.p.A. v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/02/13 (2006); Fedax N.V. v. Republic of Venezuela, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/96/3, 37 I.L.M. 1391, 1396, 29 (1998).
106. See Cheng, supra note 18, at 473 (noting that umbrella clauses, if effective,
shift power from State courts to arbitral tribunals).
107. SGS v. Pakistan, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/13, 163, 42 I.L.M.
1290, 1318; Joy Mining Machinery, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/11 82; Salini
Costruttori S.p.A, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/13, 127; Pan American Energy
LLC, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/04/8, 110; El Paso Int'l Co., ICSID (W. Bank)
Case No. ARB/03/15, 82.
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tion).0 s
Indeed, three of these divergent results-CMS Gas Transmis-
sion Co. v. Argentine Republic,"' El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine
Republic1 ° and Pan American Energy LLC v. Argentine Republic"'-
all concerned the umbrella clause in Article 11(2) (c) of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT. CMS Gas Transmission Co. found that the um-
brella clause in the U.S.-Argentina BIT transformed the contrac-
tual obligations at issue into treaty obligations, 12 while El Paso
Energy Int'l Co. and Pan American Energy LLC found that it did
not.113 To make matters worse, the tribunals in El Paso Energy
Int'l Co. and Pan American Energy LLC did not address the CMS
Gas Transmission Co. decision, even though both the El Paso En-
ergy Int'l Co. and Pan American Energy LLC tribunals stated that
their method of legal reasoning involved "following . .. impor-
tant precedents."'1 14
These apparently opposite viewpoints on umbrella clauses
may suggest to the casual observer the lack of any system of pre-
cedent even more strongly than the diversity of approaches to
the fair and equitable treatment standard. Unlike the awards
concerning fair and equitable treatment that were rendered
over seventy years, all ten awards on umbrella clauses were ren-
dered in a span of eight years, beginning with Fedax in 1998 and
ending with Pan American Energy Co. & BP Exploration v. Argentine
Republic in 2006. The temporal compression of the umbrella
clause decisions precludes an argument that the different awards
merely reflected changing norms as global investment condi-
tions and policies shifted over time.
A deeper analysis of these ten awards, however, reveals that
a system of precedent did in fact operate in their determinations
of the effect of umbrella clauses. In all ten decisions, the tribu-
108. See generally SGS v. Philippines, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6, 126
(Crivallero dissenting); CMS Gas, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/8, 1 302-03;
Eureko, 1 245 (Rajski dissenting); Noble Ventures, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/
11, 9 52; Eureko, Ad Hoc Arb., Aug. 19, 2005 245; Fedax, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/96/3, 1 29.
109. See generally CMS Gas, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/8.
110. See generally El Paso Energy Int'l Co., ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/15.
111. See generally Pan American Energy LLC, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/04/8
(2006).
112. See CMS Gas, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/8, 1 303.
113. See El Paso Energy Int'l Co., ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/15, 1 112.
114. Id. 1 110.
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nals surveyed a selection of preceding awards that addressed um-
brella clauses.1" They then appraised the legal reasoning and
policies underpinning prior decisions, and articulated reasons
for following or departing from these decisions. For example, in
SGS v. Philippines, the tribunal explicitly recognized the four rea-
sons given by the panel in SGS v. Pakistan for limiting the effect
of the umbrella clause in the Pakistan dispute." 6 The Philippines
tribunal then stated that these reasons were "unconvincing," and
proceeded to reach a different decision from the Pakistan tribu-
nal.1" 7 The Philippines tribunal found that the umbrella clause in
its dispute transformed all contractual breaches into treaty
breaches, but that a determination of whether a contractual
breach had occurred remained within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the host State's domestic courts.1" 8
The awards that were rendered after Pakistan and Philippines
also operated within a system of precedent. They did not ignore
the contradictions between two SGS awards. Instead, they stud-
ied the reasons underpinning each of the SGS awards, decided
whether to accord greater precedential weight to either Pakistan
or Philippines, and explained their reasons for doing so. For ex-
ample, when the tribunal in Eureko v. Republic of Poland adopted
the approach taken in Philippines, the Eureko panel discussed the
reasons underpinning both the Philippines and Pakistan deci-
sions, and explicitly stated that it found the reasoning of the Pa-
kistan tribunal to be "less convincing."" 9 When the tribunals in
El Paso Int'l Co. and Pan American Energy LLC decided that the
umbrella clauses in their disputes did not transform all contrac-
tual breaches into treaty violations, they explicitly considered the
differing reasons in SGS v. Pakistan and SGS v. Philippines, as well
as the awards that followed the SGS awards. 2 ° El Paso Int'l Co.
115. See, e.g., Salini Construttori S.p.A., ICS1D (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/13, 7 120-
30 (2006) (discussing SGS v. Pakistan and SGS v. Philippines); Joy Mining Machinery Ltd.,
ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/11 11 76-77 (discussing SGS v. Pakistan, SGS v.
Philippines, as well as CMS Gas); Eureko, Ad Hoc Arb., Aug. 19, 2005 7 253-255 (discuss-
ing SGS v. Pakistan, SGS v. Philippines).
116. See Socift6 G~nrale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of Philippines, ICSID
(W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6 (Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction), 121-124
(2004).
117. Id. 125.
118. Id. It 126-128.
119. See Eureko, Ad Hoc Arb., Aug. 19, 2005 1 257.
120. El Paso Energy Int'l Co., ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/8, 7 77-78; Pan
American Energy LLC, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/13, 7 106-107.
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and Pan American Energy LLC concluded that the approach in
SGS v. Philippines was flawed and "renders the whole [invest-
ment] Treaty useless."12' The tribunals accordingly followed in-
stead the precedent set by SGS v. Pakistan.
22
This decision trend indicates that the split in the interpreta-
tion of umbrella clauses does not result from any caprice of arbi-
trators, but, ironically, from tribunals following a system of pre-
cedent when faced with two contradictory prior awards. This
split, then, is similar to splits in common law systems that occa-
sionally emerge among hierarchally equal courts that confront
divergent legal positions of prior sister courts.
It should also be noted that differences between the ten
awards are in fact less acute than they appear. As mentioned
above, the greatest practical effect of umbrella clauses isjurisdic-
tional. If umbrella clauses are interpreted aggressively, they
could expand the jurisdiction of tribunals over contractual obli-
gations that would not otherwise fall within the tribunal's scope
of authority. SGS v. Pakistan and its progeny clearly limit the
jurisdictional effect of umbrella clauses to transform purely con-
tractual breaches to BIT breaches. The Philippines decision and
its progeny, while occasionally aggressive in their rhetoric, did
not in each of their disputes actually extend the tribunal's juris-
diction in any meaningful way over purely contractual disputes.
The Philippines tribunal stated that it would exercise jurisdiction
over contractual breaches if, and only if, the Philippine courts
had determined there was a contractual breach.1 3 The Eureko
panel found only that breaches by the Republic of Poland of its
other BIT obligations constituted breaches of the umbrella
clause of the BIT. 124 Noble Ventures v. Romania explicitly stated
that it was "unnecessary to express any definitive conclusion as to
whether [the umbrella clause] perfectly assimilates to breach of
the BIT any breach of the host State of any contractual obliga-
tion .... "125 The CMS Gas Transmission Co. tribunal found only
that breaches of obligations "closely related to other standards of
121. Pan American Energy LLC, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/13, 105; see
also El Paso Energy Int'l Co., ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/8, 72-73.
122. El Paso Energy Int'l Co., ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/8, 82; Pan Ameri-
can Energy LLC, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/13, I 110.
123. See SGS v. Philippines, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6, 1 126-128.
124. See Eureko, Ad Hoc Arb., Aug. 19, 2005 245, 260.
125. Noble Ventures v. Romania, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/11, 61
(2005) (emphasis in original).
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protection under the [BIT]," such as alterations to the tariff re-
gime, were BIT breaches under an umbrella clause.' 26 It did not
state that breaches of pure contractual obligations were BIT
breaches. Thus, a close examination of the awards in fact sug-
gests that a system of precedent is operating to control outcomes
of awards to be generally consistent with prior awards.
Residual divergences among tribunals considering umbrella
clauses may be attributed to differences in the wording of um-
brella clauses before the tribunals. As explained in the Noble Ven-
tures decision, the reason that the Pakistan panel did not find
that the umbrella clause transformed contractual obligations to
treaty obligations was that the clause stated that Pakistan would
merely "guarantee" the observance of commitments, a provision
which could refer to nothing more than "the adoption of steps
and measures under its own municipal law to safeguard the guar-
antee." '127 Likewise, Salini v. Jordan found that the disputed um-
brella clause did not transform contractual obligations because
that clause merely referred to "maintain [ing] . . .a legal frame-
work" for investment obligations, and did not address obliga-
tions of any other nature.1 2s By comparison, the umbrella clause
in Philippines transformed contractual breaches into treaty
breaches in a limited fashion because the clause in question pro-
vided that the host State "shall observe any obligation it has as-
sumed." 12' The Noble Ventures decision, which addressed a clause
that stated that the host State "shall observe any obligation it may
have entered into," naturally followed Philippines and not Salini
and Pakistan. 3 0
The decision trends discussed above concerning fair and eq-
uitable treatment and umbrella clauses support a credible hy-
pothesis that, in spite the absence of rules of precedent in invest-
126. CMS Gas Transmission Co., Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank)
Case No. ARB/01/8, 302 (2005).
127. Noble Ventures, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/11, 58.
128. Salini, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/13, 7 123, 126.
129. SGS v. Philippines, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/6, 77 115-118.
130. Noble Ventures, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/11, 60. But cf El Paso
Energy International Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/
15, 70 (2006) (noting that "some decisions insist on the variations in the drafting [of
umbrella clauses] to explain different analyses," but stating that the "Tribunal is not
convinced that the clauses analyzed so far really should receive different interpreta-
tions."); see also Pan American Energy LLC v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank)
Case No. ARB/04/8, 99 (2006).
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ment treaty arbitration, there is a strong-albeit imperfect and
informal-norm of accounting for prior relevant awards and
providing reasons for following or departing from those awards.
The close examination of only two controversial aspects of inter-
national investment law, admittedly, does not provide conclusive
proof that this norm of precedent operates in every aspect of
investment treaty arbitrations. Such a comprehensive survey
would necessarily exceed the space constraints of a law review
article. Until such a survey is published in another format, this
article's study of some recent awards provides a basis for induc-
ing that there is a system of precedent in investment treaty arbi-
tration.
III. APPRAISAL
The system of precedent in investment treaty arbitration sat-
isfactorily, but imperfectly, supports the three functions of pre-
cedent previously discussed: development, control, and recogni-
tion.1 3
1
A. Development
The evolution of the fair and equitable treatment standard
as articulated by arbitration tribunals suggests that the methods
of precedent they employ permit customary standards codified
in BITs to keep pace with the changing needs of investors and
host States. The trends regarding umbrella clauses, spanning
only a few years, are too recent to conclusively determine if the
development function is operating effectively. However, based
on longer trends concerning other areas of investment law, such
as the fair and equitable treatment standard, it would be reason-
able to anticipate that tribunals will respond to global policies on
umbrella clauses and other investor protections as these policies
shift.
B. Control
Strong internal controls appear to compensate for the lack
of external appellate controls on arbitral tribunals. The decision
trends concerning the fair and equitable treatment standard and
umbrella clauses indicate that arbitrators generally comply with
shared methods of legal reasoning that account for prior awards.
131. See supra Parts I-II.A.
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Although arbitrators-like judges-exercise degrees of apprecia-
tion in determining which prior decisions are relevant to dis-
putes before them, the awards studied in Part II demonstrate a
fairly thorough canvassing of prior decisions. 132 Admittedly,
these degrees of appreciation may occasionally be applied im-
perfectly, as discussed in Part II.C. But the resulting awards
speak for themselves. In spite of the broad discretion exercised
by arbitrators, the awards regarding the fair and equitable treat-
ment standard and umbrella clauses have not wildly deviated
from each other within short periods of time. Any changes have
tended to be evolutionary, and any isolated awards that have ig-
nored shared norms of legal reasoning have found limited sup-
port from subsequent tribunals.133 Such corrections may not be
as immediate as an appellate decision overruling a trial decision,
but does not necessarily take any longer than the U.S. Supreme
Court takes to overturn its prior decisions.
It is also noteworthy that the internal controls exerted by
the system of precedent do not operate in isolation. In invest-
ment treaty arbitration, other forms of legal reasoning operate
in conjunction with precedent. Investment treaty arbitrations
often begin and end with the treaty under which the dispute
arises. Tribunals generally turn first to the words of the treaty
obligations in dispute, and interpret them in accordance with
the rules of treaty interpretation contained in Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention.3 Where other tribunals have also ex-
amined similar protections, the system of precedent then oper-
ates alongside to assist the tribunal in its determinations. Thus,
the power of precedent as a control mechanism must be aggre-
gated together with other forms of control arising from shared
norms of legal reasoning.
There are at least three practical reasons to believe that the
internal control function of precedent will continue to operate
effectively. First, arbitrators are often eminent practitioners and
132. See supra Part II.
133. See Paulsson, supra note 1, at 4 ("In practice, [arbitral decisions] will be sub-
ject to the same Darwinian theory: the unfit will perish.").
134. See, e.g., Eureko, Ad Hoc Arb., Aug. 19, 2005 50-52 (interpreting umbrella
clause according to the actual words of the clause and in light of the BIT's object and
purpose); Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/12
(Award), 1 359-361 (2006) (explicitly applying rules in treaty interpretation and exam-
ining words of the BIT in light of its object and purpose to determine applicable fair
and equitable treatment standard).
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scholars.135 They are steeped in the methods of legal reasoning
in domestic and international law, and will tend to apply these
methods with which they are most familiar. To the extent that
precedent is now a method of legal reasoning embedded in
many legal systems, arbitrators will naturally operate within a sys-
tem of precedent.'36
Second, methods of legal reasoning in domestic legal sys-
tems are designed, inter alia, to promote the orderly exposition
and development of domestic law. Arbitrators are acutely aware
that international law should also be developed in an orderly
fashion and thus would tend to apply the legal methods that pro-
mote such an orderly development of international law.
The third reason may be less noble. Arbitrators reap signifi-
cant reputational benefits among fellow arbitrators, lawyers and
the college of international jurists if they render awards that are
regarded as well reasoned.' 37 In order to promote their market-
ability, popularity, and suitability for future arbitrations, arbitra-
tors may choose to apply generally accepted legal methods that
they anticipate other arbitrators, investors, host States and schol-
ars will consider legitimate and persuasive. One of these legal
methods is undoubtedly precedent. 3 '
C. Recognition
The recognition function of precedent in international arbi-
tration could be strengthened. The analysis of awards in Part II
of this Article demonstrates that international arbitrators are un-
doubtedly familiar with a system of precedent and share norms
about operating within this system. However, the lack of any
135. See Paulsson, supra note 1, at 4-5 (listing eminent arbitrators as exemplars,
and noting that "the list [of arbitrators] could be extended to include numerous schol-
ars and practitioners of international renown"); Rogers, supra note 1, at 958 ("Interna-
tional arbitrators are exceptionally talented individuals.... They boast rich and multi-
national educations from the world's most prestigious universities, and have vast exper-
iences working in the highest echelons of diverse legal systems.").
136. See Paulsson, supra note 1, at 3 ("it is fundamental to their art [that] interna-
tional adjudicators themselves rely on other international judgments").
137. See Marc Goldstein, A Career in International Commercial Arbitration, in CAREERS
IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 60 (Mark W.Janis & Salli Swartz, eds., 2001) ("Since the careers
of international arbitrators depend on their reputations, they want to impress one an-
other, the counsel and parties who appear before them, and the arbitral institutions
that appointed them.").
138. See Goldstein, supra note 137, at 61 (noting "the comprehensiveness of [inter-
national arbitrators'] analysis and citation of relevant authority.").
PRECEDENT AND CONTROL
codified set of rules governing precedents and the paucity of
scholarship discussing the operation of precedent in interna-
tional investment law has resulted in less than perfect clarity
about the role of precedent in investment treaty arbitration.
This lack of clarity could result in arbitrators, in spite of
their good faith efforts, inadvertently departing from shared
norms about the constitutive authority of prior decisions. Al-
though there is a consensus among the community of arbitrators
that prior awards must be considered, difficult questions remain
to be answered. Should awards by eminent jurists have greater
precedential value? What are the objective criteria for emi-
nence? Who decides these criteria? Consequently, Jan Paulsson,
himself an eminent arbitrator, has conceded that "the influence
of international awards and judgments is highly variable."'' 39
When departures from the system of precedent occur, the con-
trol and development aspects of precedent may be compro-
mised.
Additionally, the lack of clarity about the system of prece-
dent limits the ability of observers, including host States and in-
vestors, to properly appraise arbitral awards against fixed stan-
dards. Without an ability to appraise-and consequently con-
clude that investment treaty arbitration supports their goals and
is fair-participants in investment treaty arbitration may lose
confidence in the system. The norms of precedent should be
widely communicated to the global investment community so
that they may continue to strengthen their belief in the system's
legitimacy and continue to utilize private dispute resolution pro-
cedures.
D. Future Trends
The system of precedent in international investment treaty
arbitration may come under pressure in the near future due to
the increasing diversity of arbitrators. Historically, there has
been remarkable uniformity within the community of arbitra-
tors. Detlev Vagts has described the community of international
arbitrators as "an exclusive club in the international arena"
whose members "are automatically brought into almost any ma-
jor dispute .... ,,140 However, developments in legal education
139. See Paulsson, supra note 1, at 3.
140. See Vagts, supra note 23, at 251.
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and legal industries around the world in the latter half of the
twentieth century have resulted in the emergence of skilled prac-
titioners in many parts of the world eager to gain entry into the
"exclusive club."'' Globalization of investments has resulted in
an increased diversity of litigants from around the world, each
demanding arbitrators from their regions whom they hope will
be sensitive to their concerns.1 42 Arbitral institutions, keen to
increase the volume and size of arbitrations, are pursuing new
arbitration markets, and may therefore seek to include in their
list of arbitrators nationals from a more diverse list of countries.
These factors have led to increased diversity of arbitrators.14
Despite the pervasive perception of international arbitrators as a
"mafia,"' 4 4 this author's survey of 145 investor-State arbitrations
from the last ten years, at Table 1 below, shows that 214 different
individuals have served as arbitrators in various phases of the ar-
bitrations, and only twenty-one arbitrators-less than ten per-
cent-have served on five or more panels.
145
Table 1: Diversity of Arbitration in Investor-State Arbitrations
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141. See Rogers, supra note 1, at 965.
142. See id. at 965-66.
143. See id. at 965 (discussing "modern pressures [that] forced [international arbi-
tration] to diversify")
144. See id. at 967.
145. Sources: Investment Claims Website, www.investmentclaims.com; Investment
Treaty Arbitration Website, ita.law.uvic.ca; World Bank Website, www.worldbank.com/
icsid (all last visited Feb. 10, 2007).
PR E CEDENT AND CONTROL
The trend towards an increasing diversity of arbitrators is
likely to continue. For example, as China's economy expands,
there will be more foreign investments in China and more Chi-
nese corporations investing in other States. These market forces
will likely result in increased arbitrations involving Chinese par-
ties, and correspondingly an increased demand for Chinese arbi-
trators. On the supply side, as more Chinese law students gradu-
ate from top American and English law schools and are trained
in elite law firms on both sides of the Atlantic, there will be a
ready pool of Chinese lawyers eager to earn the "lavish fees" paid
to arbitrators. 46
With increased diversity, there is some risk of weakening of
informal shared norms about appropriate methods of legal rea-
soning. Professor Catherine Rogers has suggested that as "inter-
national arbitrators are less constrained by shared traditions,"147
they will be "less subject to the informal social controls that oper-
ated when the community was still comprised of an elite in-
group." '48 This risk may never come to pass, for it is possible
that practitioners and scholars eager to gain entry into arbitra-
tion circles may strongly embrace preexisting norms-including
norms about legal reasoning-in the hope that they will be ac-
cepted by current members of the arbitration community.
However, regardless of whether new entrants challenge or
embrace the existing system of precedent, the minimum interna-
tional response to increased diversity is the same: the system of
precedent in investment treaty arbitration must be clearer.
Through clarification, participants in the arbitration community
can debate, refine, and strengthen the existing system of prece-
dent. As community norms concerning precedent are solidified
and more widely shared, they will become more resistant to new
or existing arbitrators who desire to depart from these norms.
Additionally, in order for a new and diverse group of emerging
arbitrators to embrace shared norms about precedent, they need
to first know what these norms are. Clarification of these norms
is necessary and urgent. The author hopes that this Article has
contributed to the clarification of, and debate about, how the
system of precedent operates in investment treaty arbitration.
146. See Rogers, supra note 1, at 966.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 966-67.
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